Questions 1 and 2 Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subaltern-ing or subaltern-ed

208. On this matter I examine whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it has toward any other science the relation of making it subaltern to itself or of being subaltern to it.

I. To the First Question

[On theology in itself and in God] - To the first question I say that science taken strictly includes four things, namely: that it be certain knowledge, without deception or doubt; second, that it be about a necessary known thing; third, that it be caused by a cause evident to the intellect; fourth, that it be applied to the thing known by a syllogism or syllogistic discursion.

These things are clear from the definition of ‘know’ in Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b9-12. The last condition, namely that science is caused discursively from the cause to the thing known, includes imperfection Interpolation: “on the part of the science, because it is an equivocal effect.” ⁶⁸and also potentiality in the receiving intellect. Therefore theology in itself is not a science as to this last condition of science; but as to the other three conditions it is a science in itself and in the divine intellect.

209. [On the theology of the blessed as it is a science] - But whether as to the fourth condition it is a science as it is in the intellect of the blessed is matter for doubt.

And it seems that it is not, from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.16 n.26: “Perhaps there they will not be changeable,”     etc ., “but we will see our whole science in a single intuition;” therefore      the intellect of the blessed is not discursive, and so they will not have science as to that fourth condition of science.

But the opposite seems to be the case, because the quiddity of the subject, in whatever light it is seen, contains of itself virtually the truths that it can make known to the intellect, namely to an intellect that is passive in respect of such an object. Therefore, if the quiddity of line seen in the natural light can make known to our intellect the truths included in itself, it will, by parity of reasoning, also do the same when seen in the divine essence; but every truth caused in our intellect by something that is naturally first known is caused in it discursively, because discursion does not require succession of time or the order of time, but the order of nature, namely that the principle of the discursion is naturally known first, and that in this way it is causative with respect to the second term of the discursion.Interpolation: “On the contrary: in this way God knows other things through his own essence previously first known.” ⁶⁹

This can be conceded, namely that the blessed can truly have theological science as to all the conditions of science, because all the conditions of science truly concur in the knowledge of it.

The authority of Augustine in On the Trinity [n.209] is not cogent, because he speaks hesitantly with a ‘perhaps’; nor does he intend to assert that point, but that our word will not be equal to the divine Word, however perfect our word may also be. In like way can be expounded Augustine’s authority about the blessed vision [n.209], which only has respect to the essentialities that are in God.Interpolation: “The argument is made that God would in that case know discursively, since he understands line and the properties that are virtually included in line. Let it be that God understands line according to the requirements of line; but it is not the case that, because line has such requirement, therefore he has such understanding of it, but rather, because he has such understanding, therefore line requires to be so understood, because his science is cause and measure of the thing. However it is not so with the blessed, because the thing, whether in itself or in the Word, is always the cause of our knowledge.” ⁷⁰

210. [On the science of contingents as a science] - But there is another doubt in that question, because contingent things pertain to theology just as do necessary things [n. 150]. The thing is clear about our theology, because all the articles about the incarnation are about contingents, even in the theology of the blessed, because everything knowable about God in respect of creatures extrinsically are about contingents. But it does not seem possible for there to be science about contingents, as is clear from the definition of science [n.208]; therefore it seems that the whole of theology, in the way it extends itself to all its contents, cannot have the nature of science, whether it is discursive or not.

211. On this point I say that what belongs to perfection in science is that the knowledge is certain and evident; Interpolation: “because science is a necessarily true habit, thus what remains the same cannot be sometimes true and sometimes false, just as neither can it be sometimes science and sometimes not science, Metaphysics 7.15.1039b31-40a5; therefore it is necessarily of a necessary object, such that necessity is not only the condition of he necessary object, but is rather intrinsic to the habit itself; not indeed that the habit cannot be destroyed by forgetfulness, but that it cannot not be true, just as a statement cannot be false when it remains the same as what was true before. Therefore absolutely there is no science of what is contingent; but there is most perfect knowledge, because vision remains determinately veridical, which vision does not remain when the object is not present in itself the way science remains, wherefore vision does not have the pre-eminence. I say, therefore, that theology is of necessities about a possible, to wit ‘God is creative’, ‘God is capable of assuming our nature’; similarly in the case of practical things, ‘God is to be believed’, ‘God is to be loved’, ‘God is to be worshipped’. But of these practical necessities - besides the third - the conclusions are purely theological, the third is in some way not necessary; just as some matters of speculation are necessary and purely theological, as ‘God is Triune’, others are naturally known.” ⁷¹but as to its being about a necessary object, this is a condition of the object, not of the knowledge, because science, to the extent it is of a necessary object, can be in itself contingent and can be destroyed by being forgotten. If therefore some other knowledge is certain and evident and, as far as concerns itself, perpetual, it seems that it is formally in itself more perfect than a science that requires necessity in its object. But contingents, as they pertain to theology, naturally have a knowledge that is certain and evident and, on the part of the evidence, so far perpetual. The thing is clear, because all theological contingents are naturally seen in the first theological object, and the connection of those contingent truths in that object is naturally seen. But the vision of the extremes of a contingent truth and of their union necessarily causes evident certitude about such an evident truth. As to what concerns also the part of the theological object which displays them, such truths are naturally seen in such a perpetual object, as far as depends on itself. Therefore contingent things, as they pertain to theology, are of a nature to be more perfectly known than an acquired science about necessary things.

212. But can knowledge of them be a science? I say that according to the idea of science posited in the Posterior Analytics [n.208], which requires necessity of the object, there cannot be science of them, because to know a contingent thing as necessary is not to know it as contingent; yet, according to the way the Philosopher takes science in Ethics 6.3.1139b15-18, as divided against opinion and suspicion, there can very well be a science of them, because it also is a habit whereby we say something determinately true.

213. [On science as it is wisdom] - More properly, however, it can be said that theology is wisdom in itself, because it has evidence and necessity and certitude about the necessary things contained in it, and its object is most perfect and highest and noblest. But, as to contingent things, it has manifest evidence about the contingent things that are seen in themselves as they exist in the theological object, and it does not have evidence begged from other things prior to them; hence the knowledge of contingents, as it is possessed in theology, is assimilated rather to the understanding of principles than to the science of conclusions.

II. To the Second Question

214. To the second question [n.208] I say that this science is not subaltern to any science, because although its subject is in some way under the subject of metaphysics, yet it does not receive any of its principles from metaphysics, because no theological property is demonstrable in metaphysics through the principles of being or through reasoning taken from the idea of being.

Nor does this science make any other science subaltern to it, because no other science takes from it its principles, for anything else in the genus of natural knowledge has its resolution ultimately to some immediate principles that are naturally known.

215. On the contrary: resolution does not stop at knowables unless the knowable is the most perfect, nor does it stop there unless that knowable is most perfectly known; line is more perfectly known in the Word than by way of its own movement; therefore the resolution of conclusions about line does not stop save at the quiddity of line, or at the principles about it, as these are seen in the Word. But that resolution is had by seeing the Word. Therefore the resolution of any conclusions and principles whatever stops at the vision of the Word. Therefore that vision makes the other knowledges, to all of which it gives evidence, subaltern to itself.

216. To this I reply that although a metaphysician who knows distinctly the quiddity of line or of whole may more perfectly know some immediate principle about line or about whole than a geometer does, who only knows line and whole confusedly, yet that immediate proposition is known per se to the geometer. Nor is his proof made through the metaphysician’s proposition, provided that the truth of the combination or connection of the terms is from his confused concept evident; the only thing is that the metaphysician has a more perfect knowledge of that same per se known truth; this would be all the more so if it was only through diverse motives that line was known from diverse things and from the side of the object with equal distinctness albeit not with equal clarity.

So it is in the proposed case. An immediate principle about line can be evident to an intellect that is moved by line, and more clearly evident to an intellect moved by the Word to knowledge of line as line is more clearly seen; yet a principle known in one way does not prove itself to be known in another way, but it is known ‘by itself’ in both ways, although more clearly thus or thus. But subalternation requires that the knowledge of the principles of the higher science be the cause of knowing the principles of the lower science,     etc .Interpolation: “This about theology in itself. But what about theology of the way? Would it be subalternate if such knowledge were to be given to someone or if it has been given? - To this some say [Aquinas, Henry of Ghent] that it is subalternate; for it is subalternate to the science of God and the blessed. - Against this it is argued first in this way: these people say elsewhere that science cannot stand with faith; but, as they say, because it is subalternate, it does stand with faith; therefore, according to them, it stands and does not stand, so they contradict themselves. - Besides, the science of God can only be single; therefore none can be subalternate. - Besides, science, according to the idea of its cause, depends only on the object or the subject or the light; but the vision of the blessed possesses no idea of cause with respect to the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore etc. - Besides, a subalternating science is not first about the same truths or the aforesaid known things, because a subalternated science begins there where the subalternating science ends; but this science can be of the same things as is the science of the blessed; therefore etc. -Besides, he who has the subalternated science is capable of having the subalternating science; in the proposed case neither of these is possible; therefore etc. The major is plain as to both parts: first, because he who has the principles about a conclusion can know the conclusion; the second is likewise plain, because the principles of the subalternating science are more universal and thus, in the order of intellectual cognition, they are known first, because there a second of this sort does not proceed from things more known but from sense. The minor is also plain as to both members: just as the wayfarer cannot see clearly, so neither can the blessed have sense.” ⁷²